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New Light through Old Windows:
Restraint of Trade in English, Scottish, and
Australian Employment Laws(-) Emerging
and Enduring Issues
David CABRELLI and Louise FLOYD
The nature of the study to be pursued in this article concerns the extent to which the common law systems of
England and Australia contain principles or rules designed to impinge on an employer’s freedom of contract
or legitimate trading interests in order to promote the ability of an employee to trade, work freely, and enjoy
the benefits of his/her labour and innovations. This will entail spelling out the principal elements of both the
English and Australian concepts and outlining the differences between them in light of new problems that
have emerged as a result of recent developments in economic and social conditions.
1. INTRODUCTION
The English common law doctrine of restraint of trade, which is based on public policy, has
a venerable pedigree, stretching back to the sixteenth century.1 In English law, prior to the
introduction of the Monopolies and Restrictive Practices (Inquiry and Control) Act 1948, it was
recognized that there were three common law doctrines that regulated arrangements
between juristic persons that prohibited or restricted competition.2 First, there was the
doctrine against monopolies that would be applied to render unlawful arrangements by a
legal person that amounted to the formation of a private monopoly and excluded persons
from trade. Secondly, there was the doctrine of civil or criminal conspiracy, that is, where
two or more persons formed a combination with the wilful or malicious intention of
injuring the economic interests of a third party. Finally, the doctrine of restraint of trade
operated to control agreements purporting to restrain the ability of a member of the
community to exercise his or her trade, profession, or business. The starting point was,
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1 H. Beale (ed.), Chitty on Contracts, 30th edn (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2008), para. 16-075, at 1134.
2 A. Martin, Restrictive Trade Practices and Monopolies (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), 2–11.
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and is, that such contracts would be, and are, deemed to be unreasonable, injurious to the
public interest, and so unenforceable, unless they were, and are, no more than what was or
is reasonable and adequate to protect the legitimate commercial interests of the party
seeking the protection.3 However, as the law has evolved, the element of public interest
has been effectively subordinated to private interests to the extent that if the party seeking
to rely on the agreement is able to show that the covenant is no more than reasonably
necessary to protect its legitimate business interests, the court will decline to go one stage
further and enquire whether the arrangement is nevertheless detrimental to the public.4
Once the private aspect has been satisfied, the contractual restriction is valid regardless of
the consequences for the public. To that extent, the fact that the doctrine of restraint of
trade was and continues to be stated to be grounded in public policy was and is slightly
contrived.5
Of the three of these common law doctrines, this paper focuses on the one that is the
most relevant to employment, namely restraint of trade.6 Significantly, for the purposes of
the comparative analysis pursued in this article, the doctrine of restraint of trade is relevant
to the laws of Australia as well as both Scots and English laws. The well-worn pages of the
Honourable Justice Dyson Heydon’s classic study The Restraint of Trade Doctrine demon-
strate the reception of the earlier English and Scots laws into the comparatively youthful
Australian jurisdiction.7 Despite its rich and entrenched place in the law, however, the
doctrine of restraint of trade is not bereft of relations with other bodies of law and legal
principle. When one considers the original basic purpose of restraint law outlined above,
namely controlling agreements that purport to restrain a person from exercising his or her
trade and profession of business, there are indeed numerous and separate, albeit allied,
bodies of law that in some form or another serve the same end. Common law and equitable
duties of master and servant and good faith (respectively) and the laws relating to intellec-
tual property and trade secrets all seek to place parameters around the relationship between
employers and workers and their conduct.
Smith once retorted that the ‘doctrine of restraint of trade is a strange beast’.8
Likewise, when considering the different yet allied area of the law that protects trade
secrets, Dr Robert Dean of the Victorian Bar once asked the question: ‘Why is this area of
3 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co. [1894] A.C. 535, 565 per Lord Macnaghten and Esso
Petroleum Co. Ltd v. Harper’s Garage (Stourport) Ltd [1968] A.C. 269.
4 S. Smith, ‘Reconstructing Restraint of Trade’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 15 (1995): 565, at 591–595.
5 For example, the only case in recent years to give explicit regard to the public interest and public benefit in
considering the reasonableness of a restraint is Dranez Anstalt v. Hayek [2003] 1 BCLC 278.
6 It is interesting to note that conspiracy remains relevant to varying degrees in British and Australian labour laws
insofar as the conduct of trade unions is concerned. For example, in this regard, see Mogul Steam Ship Co. v. MacGregor,
Gow and Co. [1892] AC 25 and Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd v. Australian Federation of Airline Pilots [1991]
1 VR 637. See also L. Floyd, ‘Weipa and the Wharves: Strike Law and Trade Union Power’, University of Tasmania Law
Review 18 (1999): 65.
7 J. D. Heydon, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine, 2nd edn (Australia: Butterworths, 1999) – the trend is clear even
from a reading of the preface at p. xi. The reliance by Australian judges on cases such as Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Co.
[1894] AC 535 is discussed in this article.
8 Smith, supra n. 4, 565.
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law so confusing?’9 If one considers the basic principles of Australian and UK laws that
restrain employees from plying their trade, the insight in asking that question in a restraint
of trade context becomes clear. Essentially, not only are ‘colliding’ bodies of law in
evidence, but also two axioms of public policy are in conflict; first, freedom of contract
and second, the freedom to trade. Even from the brief outline above, it is obvious that the
laws that restrain, in the sense of shaping, employee conduct in the workplace and that limit
their rights to ply their trade and profit from their labour and innovation are diffuse in
source and effect. There is also an asymmetry in the purposes that the law is designed to
serve. Employment restraints are drawn with the objective of protecting business operations
and investment and also as a safeguard for the development of human talents and conse-
quently the societies in which those employees work.10 When one adds to this the reality
that these laws are now evolving to govern new information-driven industries such as IT,
in which workers can operate throughout global enterprises, it becomes obvious that the
norms policing the restraint of employees operate in terms of a ‘legal prism’ by drawing
light from many places and sources with these various influences being scattered and far
reaching.
2. SCOPE AND OBJECTIVE
The purpose of this article is to examine some topical issues relating to employment
restraints in England, Scotland, and Australia. The first topical issue arises in the area that
has traditionally been the province of the common law doctrine of restraint of trade, that is
to say clauses in contracts of employment that curtail or prohibit the freedom of action of
an employee subsequent to the termination of his or her employment. In this context, new
problems have emerged. These difficulties are the product of creative lawyers and drafting.
Most significantly, there is the question of the validity of cascading restraints and the
circumstances in which such clauses ought to be struck down by the courts as unlawful.
Aligned thereto are issues relating to the enforceability of clauses that seek to prohibit
ex-employees from poaching other key employees of the employer. The second topical
issue considered has arisen due to the emergence of industries such as IT. There are
questions as to how to deal with circumstances where the significance of employees to
an organization increases over time, and how the courts ought to approach the lawfulness
of the coverage of restraint clauses in the current era of globalization and the profligate
deployment of outsourcing and IT that respects no territorial boundaries. Further, in terms
of emerging issues, consideration is also given to the allied area of intellectual property.
Recent litigation has examined whether intellectual property laws circumvent the rights of
9 R. Dean, Employers, Ex-employees and Trade Secrets (Australia: Thomson, 2004), 1.
10 A. Stewart, ‘Drafting and Enforcing Post-employment Restraints’, Australian Journal of Labour Law 10 (1997): 19.
Refer also Frances Hanks & Philip Williams, Trade Practices Act: A Twenty Five Year Stocktake (Australia: The Federation
Press, 2001).
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creative employees to commercialize their intellectual and inventive capacities by placing
too great a level of significance on the employer’s property rights. These issues have arisen
especially in the Australian university sector, where inventors of patents have both suc-
ceeded and failed to protect their inventions. For some commentators, these issues cause
sufficient concern to demand the re-characterization of the employment relationship.11
Such authors argue that we should regard the employment engagement as an employee’s
opportunity to simply acquire greater skills before moving on to his/her next engagement,
which links in with the current policy emphasis at governmental levels on the promotion of
employment security rather than job security.12
The above issues surely cast new light through old windows. While many new issues
are emerging in restraint law, some traditional problems remain. Although Australian law
is developing its own character, there is still much that can be gleaned from its traditional
Anglo-Scottish roots. Similarly, as both jurisdictions meet emerging novel problems,
there is much both jurisdictions can learn from each other. This article seeks to under-
stand those developments within the framework of the standard comparative law method,
which recognizes that different jurisdictions must confront the same societal issues and
difficulties. Jurisdictions may devise different legal solutions in the sense that the legal
institutions the systems carve are formally divergent.13 Nevertheless, they may function-
ally converge in the sense that the nature and source of the laws applied in different
jurisdictions diverge in form but their application to a problem results in the same or a
broadly similar impact.14 Thus, it is common for the comparative law method to apply
the principle of functionality. For a study to be valid, the principle of functionality posits
that laws in different jurisdictions that have been designed to fulfil the same function
ought to be contrasted.15 Approached in terms of the methodological principle of
functionality, the nature of the study in this article can be articulated in terms of the
following question: To what extent do the common law systems of England and Australia
contain principles or rules that are principally designed to impinge on an employer’s
freedom of contract or legitimate trading interests in order to promote the ability of an
employee to trade, work freely, and enjoy the benefits of his/her labour and innovations?
This will entail spelling out the principal elements of both the English and Australian
concepts and outlining the differences between them.
11 J. Riley, ‘ ‘‘Capturing the Value of Work’’: Who Owns Human Capital? A Critical Appraisal of Legal
Techniques for Capturing the Value of Work’, Australian Journal of Labour Law 18, no. 1 (2005): 1.
12 See J. Rojot, ‘Security of Employment and Employability’, in Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations in
Industrialised Market Economies, ed. R. Blanpain, 8th edn (Kluwer, 2004), 375–394 and EC Green Paper, ‘Modernising
Labour Law to Meet the Challenges of the 21st Century’ (Brussels, 22 Nov. 2006), COM(2006) 708 final.
13 J. N. Gordon & M. J. Roe, ‘Introduction’, in Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance, eds
J. N. Gordon & M. J. Roe (Cambridge: Cambridge Univeristy Press, 2004), 5.
14 Ibid.
15 See K. Zweigert & H. Ko¨tz, An Introduction to Comparative Law, 3rd edn (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998),
32–47.
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3. CLAUSES IN RESTRAINT OF TRADE-EMERGING ISSUES
3.1. STEP CLAUSES OR CASCADING RESTRAINTS
3.1.1. Australia
In Re Lloyd’s Ships Holdings Pty Ltd and Queensland Merchant Holdings Limited v. Davros Pty
Ltd,16 Spender J of the Federal Court of Australia upheld the use of a cascading restraint
(also known as a ‘ladder’ or ‘step’ clause). The relevant clause in that case was found in
Clause 39 of a sales agreement, but the principles of construction applied in the case, as will
be seen, are relevant in an employment context. Importantly, Clause 39 was to ‘have effect
as if it were several covenants’ dealing with activity (that is, not to directly or indirectly
build ships, solicit, and so on); time (the clause contained ten potential time periods ranging
from one to ten years); and region (these were: United States and Australia, Australia and
New Zealand or East Coast Australia).
His Honour found that Clause 39 – with its 120 possible meanings17 – was not void
for uncertainty. Central to His Honour’s reasoning was the fact that the clause was a
collection of separate restraints such that the invalid options could be eliminated by the
courts and the valid options left standing. His Honour made a distinction between ex ante
and ex post application of the reasonableness standard to the clause. Applying the reason-
ableness test to the clause ex ante without modification would result in it being deemed to
be void from uncertainty since it would be treated as a single covenant representing the
widest restraint possible. However, an ex post application of the reasonableness measure of
scrutiny would remove any uncertainty since all combinations would be subjected to
severance and the clause would operate cumulatively. His Honour followed the earlier
reasoning of the Full Court of the Queensland State Supreme Court in JQAT v. Storm18 in
this regard.19
In coming to this conclusion, Spender J distinguished Austra Tanks Pty Ltd v.
Running20 in which the proposed restraint – ultimately held to be invalid – was a single
covenant that was said to have contained internal inconsistencies. In Austra Tanks, the term
provided that the defendant should ‘not for the stipulated period engage in the business of
the Partnership or any aspect thereof in the stipulated area’. Terms such as ‘business of the
partnership’ and ‘stipulated time and place’ were defined through variables. No term of the
contract stated that the variables were separate terms. The severance clause included
16 Re Lloyd’s Ships Holdings Pty Ltd and Queensland Merchant Holdings Limited v. Davros Pty Ltd [1987] FCA 70.
17 Ibid., para. 46.
18 JQAT Pty Ltd v. Storm [1987] 2 Qd R 162 The critical term of the cascading restraint in JQAT was 6.3:
‘The preceding sub clause 6.2 . . . shall be construed and have effect as if it were the number of separate subclauses which
results from combining the commencement of subclause 6.2 with each sub-paragraph of paragraph (a) and combining
each such combination with each subparagraph of paragraph (b) and combining each such combination with each
subclause being severable from each other such resulting subclause, and it is agreed that if any of such separate resulting
subclauses shall be invalid or unenforceable for any reason (its invalidity shall not affect the validity of the remaining
clauses)’.
19 Lloyd’s, supra n. 16, paras 66–68.
20 Austra Tanks v. Running [1982] 2 NSWLR 840.
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the following provision: ‘should any provision hereof be unenforceable by reason of its
being void at common law on the grounds of public policy as a restraint of trade that
provision shall be severed from each and every other provision of this agreement which is
not so void’. Obviously, the severance provision linked itself to the uncertain restraint and
required a judgment to be formulated by the court before it could operate.21
As to the alternative argument in Lloyd’s, namely that the cascading restraint clause left
it to the court to determine its meaning, Spender J was of the view that the fact the clause
isolated particular places and times meant the contracting parties had not absolved them-
selves from actually defining their own obligations. According to His Honour:
Provided the parties have agreed to sever those covenants that constitute an unreasonable restraint of
trade, then the paring down of the covenantor’s obligation to what the court determines to be not
unreasonable does not amount to having the court fix the limits of the restraint . . .
In my opinion, the question whether a technique of defining covenants in restraint of trade by
combining different variables of conduct, time and space, and providing that each of the covenants so
‘generated’ is subject to severance, is successful in defining enforceable restraints or is unsuccessful in
so doing, comes down to whether the exercise amounts to a genuine attempt to define the
covenantee’s need for protection, with the agreement as to severance as a precaution against the
‘all or nothing’ nature of the Court’s tests for reasonableness, or whether the exercise is simply one
where the parties have left to the court the task of making their contract for them.
One might think the more numerous the variables, and the more mechanical and indiscriminate
the combinations of variables, the more likely would be the conclusion that the exercise is of the latter
kind.
In an illuminating article on restraint of trade, Stewart is highly critical of cases such as
JQAT and Lloyd’s in which cascading restraints have been accorded judicial legitimacy:22
In (my view) all step clauses should be struck down on the ground of uncertainty. Employers and
other covenantees should be compelled to be clear as to what activities they wish to restrain, in what
location and for what period. If they exceed the limits set by the law, and find that they cannot
enforce the restraint in the face of conduct that could on any basis have been the subject of a
reasonable covenant, then so be it. That is the price to be paid for taking insufficient care or being
overly ambitious as to the scope of the restraint. The risk of losing out in that way does no more than
balance the natural advantage that most employers enjoy through superior resources, access to legal
advice and the intimidatory effect of the mere presence in a contract of a restraint, valid or not.
[However], it would be a foolish lawyer who failed to at least consider using a step clause when
drafting a post-employment restraint especially outside New South Wales. Given the current state of
the authorities, properly constructed step clauses confer an advantage on employers that is hard to
resist.
At the time of writing those words thirteen years ago, Stewart held out some hope that an
attack on step clauses could still be made. Largely, he viewed such an attack as being
grounded on the criticism of those clauses by Pincus J in Schindler Lifts.23
21 For a good relatively recent consideration of Austra Tanks, see Hydron Pty Ltd v. Harous [2005] SASC 176 per
Bleby J, at 12 and following. Hydron is itself discussed further in the body of this article at 173.
22 Stewart, supra n. 10, paras 106 et seq.
23 Schindler Lifts Australia Pty Ltd v. Debelak (1989) 15 IPR 129 as discussed by Stewart n. 10, para. 106.
172 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW
Although the present writers accept Stewart’s ‘scathingly brilliant’ critique of cascading
restraints, they are less hopeful that it will be adopted in Australian law. As recently as 2005,
judgments such as that of Bleby J in Hydron24 accepted the potential validity of the step
clause, quoting in full large passages of Spender J’s judgment in Lloyd’s.25 Far from
attempting to explore the critiques of the clauses, Bleby J adopts Spender J’s approach
seemingly without modification. Further, and more disturbingly, it seems common practice
for solicitors, especially in the state of Queensland, to ‘use a cascading restraint and if there
is a problem, let the court strike that part of it out’.26 How exactly that sort of attitude
resonates with Spender J’s circumspection towards cascading restraints that seem mechan-
ical and indiscriminate is something that leaves the present writers perplexed (discussed
above). Thus, it remains the case that one of the few cascading restraint clauses to be
invalidated was that considered in Austra Tanks where the number of variables was
82,152.27
In the view of the present writers, short of a High Court of Australia appeal on the
point, the cascading restraint looks set to remain valid practice in many parts of Australia.
The present writers, therefore, see a possibility for law reform in terms of the forum in
which these sorts of clauses ought to be considered. It is well known that Australia has
traditionally relied on a series of specialized industrial tribunals to settle many types of
disputes in employment law.28 Further, some states now have low cost common law
jurisdictions within their Magistrates’ Courts as well as a Workplace Ombudsman/Fair Work
Australia Office charged with the task of negotiating with employers on behalf of employees
as regards terms of employment that are legal yet unfair.29 In the view of the present writers,
law reform bodies in Australia should consider whether it is possible under Australian civil
procedure to invest bodies such as Magistrates’ Courts and the Workplace Ombudsman/Fair
Work Australia Office with jurisdiction to hear cases challenging restraint clauses. As alluded
to by Stewart above, one feature of step clauses is that they require litigation to clearly
determine their valid operation. The cost and stress of litigation will often prevent an
employee from taking the matter to a court hearing, hence leaving the employer in a strong
position to insist on a broad interpretation of the clause. By referring matters of this type
to low cost jurisdictions or statutory ombudsmen, there may be some hope of a more
reasonable outcome for employees in terms of the interpretation of these clauses.
Further, in the view of the present writers, thought should also be given to whether
the professional bodies that administer legislation such as the Legal Profession Act 2004 (that
is, the legislation that governs professional standards in law) may seek to issue guidelines
24 Hydron Pty Ltd v. Harous [2005] SASC 176.
25 Hydron per Bleby J, paras 72 et seq. in particular, para. 74.
26 J. Hadley, ‘Essential Employment Contract Workshop’, Lexis Nexis 2nd Annual IR Masterclass (Brisbane,
Australia, 30 Jul. 2008).
27 See also Hydron Pty Ltd v. Harous [2005] SASC 176, 12.
28 For example, B. Crieghton & A. Stewart, Labour Law (Australia: The Federation Press, 2005), 126 et seq.
29 For example, L. Floyd, ‘For Everything There Is a Season: Workplace Fairness after the Howard Government –
The No Disadvantage Test and Co-operative Federalism’, James Cook University Law Review 14 (2007): 25, at 45–49. It is
the task of the new Fair Work Australia and its predecessors such as the Workplace Ombudsman to attempt to ameliorate
the worst excesses of ‘unfair contracts’.
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about the seemingly mechanical manner in which these clauses are routinely being used.
In other words, the professional accrediting bodies should further discourage solicitors from
relying on drafting methods that are legal yet seem to mechanically exploit in the extreme
the employer’s natural bargaining strength. A final tentative suggestion of the present
writers is for the clauses to be made subject to Australian unfair contracts legislation.
3.1.2. Scots Law and English Law
The attitude of the Australian courts and Australian legal practitioners to cascading restraint
clauses is of interest to employment lawyers in the United Kingdom. To date, there have
been no cases in English law or Scots law that have considered such clauses. However, it is
generally recognized among legal practitioners and academic lawyers that such step clauses
would be struck down. There are four particular reasons for this approach. First, it is far
from clear whether a UK court would treat such measures as sufficiently certain to warrant
protection. Here, the arguments are identical to those advanced by Stewart above in
Australia. In the recent case of TFS Derivatives Ltd v. Morgan,30 the court reminded
employers and employees that the first task of a UK court is to construe the words of the
covenant in order to ascertain exactly what it means. While the Court of Appeal stated in
the recent case of Beckett Investment Management v. Hall31 that the court should not adopt a
literal approach to the clause and instead should construe it in light of the object and intent
of the contract as a whole by not readily seeking to denude it of all practical utility in
circumstances where the parties are familiar with the background to and the aim of the
clause,32 this is not the same thing as saying that a clause that is capable of tens or hundreds
of interpretations should not be set aside for lack of certainty. The underlying rationale for
this viewpoint is linked in with the second reason why it is generally recognized among
legal practitioners and academic lawyers in the United Kingdom that such step clauses
would be held to be invalid. In the case of a discretionary cascading restraint clause, the
employer is essentially delegating the task of drawing the parameters of the parties’ con-
tractual bargain ex post facto to the court. In UK law, the role of the court is first, to interpret
the clause, second, to identify the legitimate commercial interests of the employer, and
third, finally and most importantly, to ascertain whether the prohibitions and/or restraints
in the restrictive covenant are more than (or compatible with) what is reasonably necessary
for the protection of the legitimate business interests of the employer.33 The difficulty with
a cascading restraint clause is that, by definition, it merges the first and third requirements
and more importantly, as a result, it precludes the court from performing its final and most
important role in any meaningful sense; there is nothing in the clause but a series of options
30 [2005] IRLR 246, 251–252, paras [37]–[39] per Cox J.
31 [2007] EWCA Civ 613; [2007] I.R.L.R. 793.
32 Similar sentiments were expressed by Chadwick LJ in Arbuthnot Fund Managers v. Rawlings [2003] EWCA Civ
518 [2003] All ER (D) 181 (Mar), paras [20]–[24].
33 TFS Derivatives Ltd v. Morgan [2005] IRLR 246, 251–252, paras [37]–[39] per Cox J. See also Office Angels Ltd v.
Rainer-Thomas [1991] IRLR 214, 219 per Sir Christopher Slade.
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against which it can measure the ‘reasonably necessary’ test. Instead, the employer is
abdicating its responsibility to set the exact parameters of the prohibitions or restrictions
in the clause to the court and is then craving the court to choose whether the parameters –
which the court itself has drawn – are more than is reasonably necessary for the protection
of the employer’s legitimate commercial interests. For this reason, it is standard not to
deploy such clauses in restrictive covenants governed by English or Scots law for a real fear
that they will be held to be unenforceable in restraint of trade.
The third rationale for the general understanding that step clauses are unlikely to be
enforceable is that there is a clear rule of the common law that directs that what is
reasonably necessary for the protection of the employer’s legitimate interests is to be
assessed by the court from the perspective of reasonable persons in the position of the
contracting parties as at the date of the formation of the contract of employment, having
regard to the contractual provisions as a whole and to the factual matrix to which the
contract would then realistically have been expected to apply.34 However, this is the exact
opposite of what the cascading restraint clause is requesting that the court actually do.
Instead, it is enjoining the court to craft the boundaries of the contract for the parties and
apply the ‘reasonably necessary’ test at the date of the court hearing. For that reason, it is
difficult to understand how such clauses could be valid. A fourth rationale is based on the
common law rules for severance of portions of restrictive covenants. In terms of English
and Scots laws, the courts will only be prepared to sever part of a restrictive covenant
pursuant to the ‘blue pencil’ rule where (1) the ‘offending’ portion of the clause can be
excised without rewriting the clause for the parties; and (2) the deletion does not result in
the situation whereby the original character of the provision has so changed that it has
evolved into something altogether different from what the parties originally entered.35
Alternatively put, the courts have no right to come to the assistance of the drafter by
applying their knowledge of the law to carve out the maximum of what the drafter might
have validly required to make the contract enforceable. In the context of the cascading
restraint clause, it is submitted that the very nature of the task that the parties have delegated
to the tribunal or court is such that it is essentially enjoining them to sever and rewrite the
restrictive covenant and turn the provision into something that it originally was not.
For that reason, it is submitted that the cascading restraint/step clause would breach the
English and Scots law rules on severance.
The closest the UK courts have come to considering a cascading restraint/step clause
was Seabrokers Ltd v. Riddell36 where the employer adopted a discretionary sliding scale
approach to a non-compete covenant. The covenant purported to enable the employer
to select a period of anything up to twelve months for the non-compete covenant, such
period to be notified by the employer to the employee at the point of the termination of
34 TFS Derivatives Ltd v. Morgan [2005] IRLR 246, 251–252, paras [37]–[39] per Cox J.
35 Atwood v. Lamont [1920] 3 K.B. 571; Mason v. Provident Clothing and Supply Co. Ltd [1913] A.C. 724, 745
per Lord Moulton; Hinton & Higgs (UK) Ltd v. Murphy 1989 S.L.T. 450; Living Design (Home Improvements) Ltd v. Davidson
1994 S.L.T. 753.
36 [2007] CSOH 146.
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the employee’s employment. Essentially, such a clause was an ingenious attempt by the
employer to reflect upon and choose a particular period at termination, rather than at the
point of the execution of the contract of employment. Thus, the employer introduced a
mechanism to defer the difficult question of the appropriate temporal restriction. When the
employee resigned, the employer wrote to the employee acknowledging his resignation
and purported to engage the non-compete covenant by stating that the employee would be
prohibited from competing with the employer for a period of ‘up to a maximum of twelve
months’. The question was whether the employer had adequately invoked the non-
compete covenant.
In the Scottish Court of Session, Lady Paton held that the employer had not properly
applied the non-compete covenant, since it envisaged the intimation of a particular fixed
period, for example, three months, six months, or twelve months. The employer had failed
to do this and so the clause did not ‘bite’. Placing that particular point to the side, the court
had nothing to say about the general enforceability of such a discretionary sliding scale
clause in the event that the employer had adequately complied with its terms and selected
an identifiable period of time. In principle, there might appear to be no particular reason
why such a clause should be any more unenforceable than a twelve-month non-compete
clause that is fixed at the point of the execution of the contract of employment. However,
it is submitted that such an approach is inconsistent with the rule that post-termination
covenants should be no wider than is reasonably necessary for the protection of the
employer’s interests. As argued above, what is reasonably necessary is to be assessed with
reference to the perspective of what a reasonable person in the position of the contracting
parties would make of the clause as at the date of the formation of the contract of
employment – not at the point of termination. On this basis, it is doubtful whether such
a clause would carry much favour with an English or Scots court of law.
3.2. ANTI-POACHING OF EMPLOYEES CLAUSES
3.2.1. Australia
The main Australian case in which clauses limiting the ‘poaching’ of employees (by former
employees) have been considered is Hartley’s Limited v. Martin.37 That case involved two
brothers employed as investment advisors who were leaving their employer for ABN
AMRO Morgan – a competitor brokerage house. Significantly, the two brothers intended
taking their secretary with them, the effect being that they were leaving as a unit to work
for the competitor firm.
Relevantly, the contracts of employment of the brothers contained a restraint of trade,
which also included an anti-poaching clause not to:
37 Hartleys Limited v. Martin [2002] VSC 301 per Gillard J.
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employ, engage, solicit or entice away or endeavour to employ, engage, solicit or entice away from
HPL any key employee of HPOL.
In upholding the clause, Gillard J found that the employer had a legitimate interest to
protect, namely a proprietary interest in maintaining its client base. The above clause did
not operate simply as an unreasonable shield from competition and therefore did not offend
the traditional principles laid down by Lord MacNaughten in Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt
Guns and Ammunitions Co. Ltd.38 The Martin brothers had little experience when they
arrived at Hartleys, and Hartleys had assisted the pair in building up both expertise and a
client base. On the evidence, relationships between advisors and clients were highly
significant. Frequently, clients would remain with a particular adviser for years and those
advisors would acquire ‘personal knowledge of and influence over clients’ in the course of
their work.39 Gillard J also noted that the two brothers had been paid well in exchange for
signing the contract containing this clause and that the clause itself was reasonable since it
was limited in its duration to three months. Given that their move to ABN was advertised
in the financial press, Gillard J concluded it was reasonable that Hartleys restrain the
brothers for three months so that the ex-employer could take reasonable steps to protect
its business and client base.
With regard to the position in respect of Ms Briggs, the secretary ultimately covered
by the anti-poaching clause, Gillard J was willing to consider her as a ‘key employee’
covered by the anti-poaching clause. On the evidence, Gillard J found that Ms Briggs ‘had
knowledge of (the Martin brothers) managed funds, their administrative arrangements for
managing the funds, and knowledge of and contact with the plaintiff’s clients handled by
(the Martin brothers)’.40
Subsequent cases such as Pinnacle Hospitality People Pty Ltd v. Ramasamy & Ors41 and
Brilliant Lighting (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Baillieu42 have both followed Gillard J’s statement of
principle on restraint of trade,43 Osborn J in Pinnacle going so far as to call the conduct of the
Martin brothers in Hartley’s as a ‘flagrant attempt to pirate customers’.44 But neither of these
cases concentrated on anti-poaching clauses in detail. Kearney v. Crepaldi and Ors45 did raise
the specific issue of anti-poaching clauses. The judge in the case, Justice McDougall,
questioned (but did not definitely determine) whether maintaining a stable workforce
was a sufficient interest to justify an anti-poaching restraint. However, His Honour suggested
anti-poaching clauses may be sustainable where the former employee who seeks to poach
other staff has a special knowledge of the workplace that allows them to target staff.46
38 Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunitions Co. Ltd [1894] AC 535.
39 Hartley’s, para. 116.
40 Hartley’s, para. 12.
41 Pinnacle Hospitality People Pty Ltd v. Ramasay & Ors [2007] VSC 433.
42 Brilliant Lighting (Aust) Pty Ltd v. Baillieu [2004] VSC 248.
43 Pinnacle, para. 3 and Brilliant, para. 7.
44 Pinnacle, para. 28.
45 [2006] NSWSC 23 (10 Feb. 2006) per McDougall J.
46 Kearney at paras 57–58, 64–69, 80–83, 87 and 90.
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The recent 2009 decision of Integrated Group Limited v. Dillon47 seems to accept that
employers do have a sufficient interest in maintaining a stable workforce for anti-poaching
clauses to be valid.
The main critique of Hartleys v. Martin comes from Riley.48 Riley views Gillard J’s
judgment as being similar to the decisions of the Court of Appeal in Office Angels Ltd v.
Rainer-Thomas49 and Dawnay Day & Co. Ltd v. De Braconier D’Alphen,50 both of which
upheld terms preventing the recruitment of staff. Riley insists this is a ‘worrying line of
authority’.51 She states that ‘the rot has begun’52 in Australia after Hartley’s53 and alter-
natively that the harm ‘has been done’.54 Relying on the work of American commentators
such as Stone,55 Riley argues that today’s workplace can no longer be viewed in terms of
‘womb to tomb’ employment. Rather, employees take on employment as a means of
enabling themselves to continually up-skill in order to facilitate their onward movement to
the next opportunity. Further, Riley posits that there is no proprietary interest in clients –
rather they are free agents who can do business with whomsoever they please.56 In Riley’s
opinion, there is no special significance to be attached to a business organization con-
temporaneously losing an entire team of employees:57
It is difficult to see how these decisions on ‘poaching’ staff can stand beside the established principle
that an employer cannot prevent staff from leaving and taking with them to a competitor the ‘skill,
experience, know-how and general knowledge inevitably gained’ during the initial employment. If
one cannot stop another employee from leaving, how can one purport to stop another employee
from inviting her to leave? These cases go too far and seek to arrogate to the employer a benefit to
which the employer has no legitimate claim, especially in the new boundaryless workplace where
there are no promises of long-term employment security as reciprocation for such loyalty.
In the course of her argument, Riley also seeks to place reliance: on the works of the
Honourable Justice Dyson Heydon; on the British case of Kores Manufacturing Co. Ltd v.
Kolak Manufacturing Co. Ltd;58 and an article by Sales.59 Riley is also strongly critical of
Gillard J’s treatment of the Martin brothers’ secretary, whom Riley basically perceives to
have been ‘cut adrift’.60
There is no doubt that Riley’s arguments are both thought-provoking and topical and
that parts of her book on the common law of the contract of employment make an
47 [2009] VSC 361 (25 Aug. 2009).
48 J. Riley, Employee Protection at Common Law (Australia: The Federation Press, 2005) and J. Riley, ‘Who Owns
Human Capital? A Critical Appraisal of Legal Techniques for Capturing the Value of Work’, Australian Journal of Labour
Law 18, no. 1 (2005). This latter article of Riley is substantially similar to Ch. 6 of her book.
49 [1991] IRLR 214.
50 [1997] IRLR 442.
51 Employee Protection at Common Law, supra n. 45, 187.
52 Ibid., 190.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid., 189.
55 Ibid., 168.
56 Ibid., 184.
57 Ibid., 189–190.
58 [1957] 1 WLR 1012.
59 P. Sales, ‘Covenants Restricting Recruitment of Employees and the Doctrine of Restraint of Trade’, Law
Quarterly Review 104 (1988): 600.
60 Employee Protection at Common Law, supra n. 45, 190.
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extremely rich contribution to scholarship. However, the present writers respectfully disagree
with her criticism of Hartley’s v. Martin and her interpretation of anti-poaching clauses. Some
aspects of Riley’s case may be countered in fairly brief terms. In his most illuminating of
works, The Restraint of Trade Doctrine, the Honourable Justice Heydon is not quite, as Riley
suggests, silent as to anti-poaching clauses. Alluding to the clauses in what seems to have been
their earlier guises, His Honour states: ‘There is no reason to suggest that the list of legitimate
interests is closed’.61 Second, the Kores decision does not deal with clauses that limit the
capacity of ex-employees to recruit their former colleagues but rather considered a clause
between two companies in which those corporate entities sought to restrict their capacity to
recruit from each other. Therefore, the case is distinguishable from Hartley’s.
The Sales article62 is largely directed at the Kores decision from the perspective of the
law of England and Wales. Even so, Sales is circumspect as to whether an anti-poaching
clause is valid – although he leaves the ultimate view as to their validity an open question.
According to Sales, if an anti-poaching clause is to be found valid, then it would be on the
grounds that it protects the goodwill of the original business. If the clause is to be found
invalid, it is because it unreasonably prevents the former employee from plying his or her
trade.63 Indeed, since the publication of Sales’ article, cases such as Dawnay Day & Co. Ltd
and Another v. D’Alphen and Others64 and TSC Europe (UK) Ltd v. Massey65 have since been
decided and the English courts have recognized the legitimate interest of an employer in
protecting and maintaining a stable and well-trained workforce.66
When an entire section of an employer’s workforce departs, the relevant question is
no longer confined to whether the employee’s capacity to work is being unreasonably
interfered with. Rather, the question is whether the original employer is able to function
when a large section of its business no longer exists. The issue of poaching staff goes well
and truly beyond the unreasonable limitation of an employee from working or utilizing
reasonable skills he or she has built up in his or her career. Instead, it goes to the very
essence of business goodwill, the maintenance of client relationships, and the basic capacity
to function commercially in the marketplace. Employers may often spend thousands of
dollars in developing young staff – as the employer did in the case of the Martin brothers.
Thus, the departure of the entire section of the business of the employer that such staff has
led not only negates that investment, but may also operate to effectively cripple that sector
of the employer’s business. The question then surely becomes – at a public policy level –
will it not be the case that businesses will be reticent to take on employees and invest in
their training and development if their investment does not carry with it a particular form
of reasonable restraint?
61 Heydon, supra n. 7, 101. For a similar sentiment to the effect that there is no numerus clausus of legitimate
commercial interests that an employer may legitimately seek to protect by a clause in restraint of trade, see Bridge v.
Deacons [1984] AC 705, 714 per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton.
62 Sales, supra n. 56, 600.
63 Ibid., 610–611 as opposed to 603.
64 [1998] ICR 1068.
65 [1999] IRLR 22.
66 See below for further discussion.
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Rather than engage in arguments against anti-poaching clauses, it is submitted that the
real issue is whether they are in fact worth the paper they are written on. One might
conjecture that one of the reasons why decisions examining the validity of such clauses are
scarce on the ground is attributable to the real possibility that employers are reluctant to lay
themselves open to the particular commercial vulnerability of having indirectly divulged to
the marketplace that they may lack the capacity to service clients once a team has gone.
Further, it is significant that these clauses will only be held valid if they are reasonable. If
staff were friendly, then in all likelihood after the reasonable period of time passes, they will
move across to the new workplace in any event.67
One final note regarding Riley’s argument concerns the Martin brother’s secretary.
In the view of the present writers, Riley omits one very significant point. In asking their
secretary to join them, the Martin brothers knew they were breaching their anti-poaching
clause. Therefore, they knew their actions may have been invalidated by a court such that
the secretary may have been made vulnerable.68
3.2.2. Scots Law and English Law
The position with regard to anti-poaching clauses in English law and Scots law is that they
are valid and enforceable insofar as the employer is able to demonstrate that they are no
more than what is reasonably necessary to protect its legitimate business interest in main-
taining a stable and well-trained workforce. The recognition by the UK courts that an
employer will indeed have a legitimate business interest in protecting a stable and well-
trained workforce by introducing a non-poaching of employees clause into contracts of
employment is a recent common law innovation. In the first case to consider the issue,
namely Hanover Insurance Brokers Ltd v. Schapiro,69 the Court of Appeal took the view that
an insurance broking firm had no entitlement to impose a covenant against competition on
a former employee. Although the goodwill of an insurance broker’s business might depend
on its staff, that did not make the staff an asset of the broker and the staff had a right to work
that the covenant could not defeat. However, three months later in November 1993, the
Court of Appeal handed down another judgment in the case of Ingham v. ABC Contract
Services Ltd.70 In Ingham, the Court of Appeal took the opposite view to that in Hanover
Insurance Brokers and ruled that an employer did indeed have a legitimate business interest in
maintaining its staff base. When the Court of Appeal revisited the issue four years later in
the case of Dawnay Day & Co. Ltd and Another v. D’Alphen and Others,71 Evans LJ
considered each of the competing decisions in Ingham and Hanover Insurance Brokers and
opted in favour of the principle in Ingham that employers do indeed have a legitimate
67 Heydon, supra n. 7, 100 on friendship not being something that can be restrained.
68 See generally J. Birch, ‘Breach of Confidence: Dividing the Cause of Action along Proprietary Lines’, Australian
Law Journal 81 (2007): 338 for a discussion of proprietary interests in the slightly different context.
69 [1994] IRLR 82.
70 (Unreported) 12 Nov. 1993.
71 [1998] ICR 1068.
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business interest to protect in relation to their staff.72 However, it was emphasized that the
principle was subject to the restraint of trade doctrine. The effect of this is that a covenant
can be struck down if it exceeds what is reasonably necessary to protect the employer’s
legitimate business interests.
TSC Europe (UK) Ltd v. Massey73 followed Dawnay Day by holding that the employer
had a right to protect its legitimate interests in maintaining a stable, trained workforce.
Under his contract of employment, the employee had agreed that, for a period of three
years from the date of the agreement or one year following the effective date of termination
of his employment, whichever was the later, he would not ‘solicit, procure or induce or
endeavour to procure or induce, any employee of his employer to leave his employment
with such company’. The question was whether that clause was too wide to protect the
legitimate business interests of TSC. In the High Court, Whiteman J ruled that since the
non-poaching covenant applied to all employees, rather than being limited to key or senior
employees, and that it applied to any employee who joined the company during the
prohibited period, it was wider than was reasonably necessary to protect the employer’s
legitimate interests.
In the recent case of UBS Wealth Management (UK) Ltd and Another v. Vestra Wealth
LLP and Others,74 the High Court granted a springboard injunction against Vestra as a result
of mass poaching of staff from UBS that was in breach of a restrictive covenant prohibiting
the founder of Vestra from poaching or soliciting the staff of UBS. Pending full trial, the
High Court ruled that Vestra were prohibited from, among other things, poaching any
more UBS employees or doing business with existing UBS clients. Thus, in recent times,
like the Australian case of Hartley’s Limited v. Martin, it is particularly clear that this area has
also seen a shift towards a greater willingness on the part of the courts to find covenants
prohibiting or restricting former employees from poaching or soliciting the staff of the
employer duly enforceable. However, further groundbreaking developments in this area
remain to be seen.
4. RESTRAINT OF TRADE IN EVOLVING SPHERES – INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY;
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY; AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF RESEARCH
4.1. IN A CHANGING, GLOBALIZED IT INDUSTRY, WHAT IS REASONABLE?
4.1.1. Australia
At the heart of this article is the metaphor of seeing new light through old windows or, in
other words, how the restraint of trade doctrine, with its pedigree evolving from cases and
72 [1998] ICR 1068, 1110–1111 per Evans LJ.
73 [1999] IRLR 22.
74 [2008] EWHC 1974 (QB); [2008] I.R.L.R. 965.
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policies dating back to the sixteenth century, is dealing with the employment issues of the
twenty-first century. Indeed, some ‘new’ industries such as IT are almost ephemeral in
terms of the frequency and magnitude of developments they have spawned. The inherent
relevance, to IT, of knowledge rather than physical labour may not have been in the ready
contemplation of the original doctrine of restraint. As Freedland has noted, the identifica-
tion of a commercial interest on the part of the employer has become particularly
problematic:
as the economic activity in question, whether in the manufacturing or service sector, becomes more
and more heavily invested in highly specific knowledge and information technology.75
In such a changing commercial environment, the Australian decision of Portal Software v.
Bodsworth76 is of interest. In that case, a restraint of six months, which was applied against a
computer programmer, was upheld by the New South Wales Supreme Court.
At first blush, six months may seem a long period of restraint in the computing
industry. After all, it is not uncommon for the life of a new computer program to be
measured by reference to short-term impact.77 However, certain crucial factors arose in
Bodsworth. First, the employee was in a position through which he gained intimate knowl-
edge of customers’ business requirements. Second, the employee could also tailor products
to suit the needs of particular customers. While the employee was negotiating a new job
with a competitor of his employer, he was also sitting in on highly confidential and
sensitive meetings at which his employer was developing new products. In those circum-
stances, a six-month restraint was reasonable to protect the business of the employer.
The enforceability of such a restraint is particularly interesting given recent Australian
decisions that have cast doubt on the efficacy and enforceability of garden leave clauses used
in conjunction with restraints – or as an alternative to restraints.78
4.1.2. Scots Law and English Law
Bodsworth can be contrasted with the Scottish case of Axiom Business Computers Ltd v.
Frederick,79 which is one of the few cases in the United Kingdom to have considered
restrictive covenants in the field of IT. In Axiom, the employer was engaged in selling
computerized time recording systems to firms of accountants and lawyers. The contract of
75 M. Freedland, The Personal Employment Contract (Oxford: Oxford Univeristy Press, 2003), 182.
76 Portal Software v. Bodswrorth [2005] NSWSC 631 per White J The authors thank Dr Max Spry of the Brisbane
Bar for suggesting a short study of this case and the notion that trade restraint has different nuances in different industries.
77 The short life of some technologies is notorious. One everyday Australian example includes the practice of some
department stores in not allowing purchase of some IT goods by the traditional lay-by (that is where customers pay off an
item interest free while the goods remain in store). Instead, they will only allow credit or cash sales so that the title to the
goods passes immediately. (Title to goods does not so pass with lay-by).
78 A. Coulthard, ‘Garden Leave, the Right to Work and Restraints on Trade’, Australian Journal of Labour Law 22
(2009): 87. This note considers the decisions of: Bearing Point Australia Pty Ltd v. Hillard [2008] VSC 115 and Tullett Prebon
(Australia) Pty Ltd v. Purcell (2008) 175 IR 414. Bearing Point involved the managing director of information management
of a management technology consulting company.
79 2003 GWD 37-1021.
182 INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE LABOUR LAW
employment of a software developer employed by Axiom prohibited her from competing
with her employer in the following terms:
you will not seek or accept employment (whether as employee, agent, director or otherwise) with any
of the employer’s competitors in the field of computer systems for a period of one year after
termination of your employment with the employer.
The Scottish Court of Session ruled that this covenant was unenforceable for four principal
reasons. First, the generality of the employer’s market described in the above clause
rendered the clause unenforceable. Rather than restricting the scope of the market to
‘the field of the sale and supply of computer systems and software to the legal profession and
the commercial market’, it extended to ‘the field of computer systems’. Thus, it was
beyond what was reasonable to protect the legitimate commercial interests of the employer.
Second, the clause did not prevent the employee from being self-employed in the field of
computer systems. On this basis, Lord Bracadale held that it was difficult to see why the
employee should be prevented from working for a competitor. Third, the court recognized
that, in comparison with post-termination covenants restricting the solicitation of custo-
mers, the common law had adopted a stricter approach with respect to the enforcement of
post-termination restraints on the employment of a former employee. A classic example of
this in terms of Scots law is the case of Scottish Dairy Farmers Co. (Glasgow) Ltd v. McGhee80
and in terms of English law, the case of Bridge v. Deacons.81 Post-termination restraints on
the employment of a former employee are only justified where it is considered necessary to
protect the trade secrets or the customer base of the employer.82 In Axiom, the court held
that such protection was already afforded by the existence of the post-termination cove-
nants in other parts of the employee’s contract, which provided protection for the
employer with respect to the preservation of trade secrets and solicitation of customers.
As a result, the non-competition covenant represented additional unwarranted protection
for the employer, which was not legitimate in the circumstances. Finally, the absence of any
territorial restriction meant that the restriction could be construed to be worldwide in
scope. The absence of a territorial restriction resulted in the clause being deemed to be too
wide. However, it ought to be mentioned that in other cases decided in accordance with
English and Scots laws, it has not always been the case that the absence of a geographical
limit has been fatal to the validity of a non-compete covenant.83
Apart from the cases of Bodsworth and Axiom, it is noteworthy that there appear to be
few restraint cases dealing with IT in the United Kingdom or Australia. One might
speculate that that fact is attributable to the use by many businesses of independent
contractors in IT service provision.84 There are limits on the extent to which an indepen-
dent contractor can be restrained as their essential nature is to contract out their services.
80 [1933] S.L.T. 142.
81 [1984] AC 705, 713 per Lord Fraser of Tullybelton.
82 Herbert Morris Ltd v. Saxelby [1916] 1 AC 688, 701–702 per Lord Atkinson.
83 Intercall Conferencing Services Ltd v. Steer (2007) EWHC 519 and Cyrus Energy Ltd v. Stewart [2009] CSOH 53;
2009 GWD 15-235.
84 Forms of Employment (Australian Bureau of Statistics Report Number 6359, 2008).
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In those circumstances, however, the problem of confidential information is significant – so
that contractors themselves cannot lay claim to, for example, trade secrets and cannot take
for themselves the intellectual property of another.
4.2. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS: AN UNREASONABLE LIMITATION ON THE RIGHTS
OF CREATIVE EMPLOYEES AND THEREFORE A RESTRAINT OF TRADE?
Although section 51(3) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 in Australia seeks to exempt a
number of intellectual property rights from the prohibitions of the Act, there is an obvious
interface between competition law and intellectual property. Authors Oddie and Eyers
have written: ‘intellectual property laws propagate and endorse limited monopolies to
encourage innovations. In contrast, competition law often regards monopoly rights as
inefficient in the allocation of scarce resources’.85 Those authors report what they see as
an increasing tendency for alleged copyright infringers to raise restraint of trade issues
against the holders of intellectual property rights.86 The notion of restraint of trade,
therefore, becomes relevant to intellectual property both in terms of the doctrine itself,
and in terms of the broader suite of laws that curtail and therefore restrain an employee’s
freedom to utilize his or her professional skills. The matter also goes to the basic policy
question as to the reasonableness of the parameters those laws place around the employment
relationship.
An important issue has been recently litigated in Australia relates to the extent to
which an employer (especially a University) can claim intellectual property in its employ-
ee’s inventions. This issue arose in University of Western Australia v. Gray.87 In 1985, Dr
Bruce Gray was appointed a Professor of Surgery at the University of Western Australia
(‘UWA’). Importantly, at the time of his appointment, Dr Gray had been engaged for many
years in researching the treatment of liver cancer. Dr Gray had worked with Dr Mark
Burton previously at the University of Melbourne. The pair was working together again at
the UWA.88 Around the year 2000, UWA became aware of Dr Gray’s involvement with
an external company and the prospect of commercialization of the technologies on which
he was working. UWA sent letters to Dr Gray stating that the university might have some
claim to the intellectual property rights being developed by Dr Gray with the company.89
Ultimately, the matter escalated into litigation. UWA alleged that Dr Gray had
breached his contract of employment by failing to comply with disclosure and associated
obligations imposed by the UWA patent regulations. UWA’s case against Dr Gray was
85 C. Oddie & P. Eyers, ‘Erosion of Rights – Redressing the Balance: Competition Challenges to Intellectual
Property Rights’, Trade Practices Law Journal 12 (2004): 6.
86 Ibid., 14.
87 University of Western Australia v. Gray [2008] FCA 498 (This first instance judgment of French J was subsequently
upheld - see below). In terms of the obvious links between restraint of trade and intellectual property, note also Professor
Andrew Stewart: it is not uncommon for contract of employment to have confidentiality agreement and intellectual
property clauses. See also M. Jackson, A Practical Guide to Protecting Confidential Business Information and J. McKeough, A.
Stewart & P. Griffith, Intellectual Property in Australia, 3rd edn (Sydney: Butterworths, 2004).
88 University of Western Australia v. Gray, para. 1.
89 Ibid., 5.
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‘critically dependent’ on the proposition that there was an implied term in Dr Gray’s
contract of employment that intellectual property developed in the course of his employ-
ment belonged to the university.90
The Honourable Justice French91 rejected the University’s arguments. Critical to the
rejection of the claim in contract (as to implied terms) was His Honour’s finding that the
function Dr Gray was actually employed to do at the University was to research – and
research did not carry with it an obligation to commercially invent. That being the case, the
inventions of Dr Gray remained precisely that – the inventions of Dr Gray.92
His Honour urged an approach by Universities that acknowledges the rights of both
parties to the employment relationship:
It would seem that the only secure way for UWA to acquire property rights from its academic staff of
intellectual property developed by them in the course of research at UWA is by express provision in
their contracts of employment. Even then, as this case demonstrates, the transaction costs of admin-
istering and enforcing such provisions and the uncertainty surrounding their scope and application,
raises a real question as to their utility. The length and complexity of this litigation has been
exceptional. However any claim by a university to intellectual property rights whose creation has
involved a team of research workers, external funding, collaborative arrangements and extended
periods of conceptual and practical development is likely to pose similar difficulties. UWA and other
universities might well consider the alternative of deriving benefits from inventions produced by their
staff by offering highly competent and experienced commercialisation services in exchange for a
negotiated interest in the relevant intellectual property. That alternative offers many benefits in terms
of incentives, harmony and certainty that are not available through the enforcement of legal rights
unlikely to be capable of precise definition.93
On 3 September 2009, Justices Lindgren, Finn, and Bennett of the Federal Court of Australia
(Full Court) unanimously rejected UWA’s appeal against the judgment of French J.94
Crucially, their Honours found that there was no implied duty incumbent on Dr Gray
to invent. This was not only due to the wording of his contract of employment but also due
to the nature of academic employment. Academics are to add to the greater stock of
knowledge; they have a large discretion over the topics they will research; they are to
disseminate information, work collaboratively, and in the modern era, seek funding from
external sources.95 All these basic features of academic life are a sharp contrast to a
commercial entity developing an invention, the ‘fruits’ of which it aimed to keep for
itself.96
On that latter point, the Court found UWA’s argument lacking in that it did not fully
appreciate the relationship between the strands of law relevant to restraint, confidentiality,
90 Ibid., paras 9 and 12.
91 As he then was. He is now the Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia.
92 University of Western Australia v. Gray, para. 12.
93 Ibid., para. 13.
94 [2009] FCAFC 116 (3 Sep. 2009).
95 Ibid., paras 165–218.
96 On the question of implication of contractual terms, their Honours considered the test of necessity and the
relevance of surrounding circumstance, cf. Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v. State Rail Authority of NSW (1982) 149 CLR 337
and Lister v. Romford Ice and Cold Storage Co. Pty Ltd [1957] AC 555. Their Honours also considered relevant scholarship
and critiques such as Pedan, ‘Policy Concerns behind Implication of Terms in Law’, Law Quarterly Review 117 (2001):
459 – referred to at, e.g., [2009] Federal Court of Australia: Full Court [Neutral Citation] 116 (3 Sep. 2009), para. 135.
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implied terms, and inventions. Reminiscent of the words of Dr Robert Dean cited earlier
in this article (namely, why is this area of law so confusing?), their Honours noted that
UWA had seemed to isolate its argument as to implied terms from any argument about
secrecy owed by the employee to the employer. By so doing, they had not understood the
multifaceted nature of this area of the law and had not established that the inventions
Dr Gray was working on were being developed (confidentially) for the university.97
Their Honours, similar to French J, acknowledged that UWA had not kept its policies
and copyright mechanisms up-to-date and some had fallen into disuse (or even been
abandoned).98 In contrast, the environment in which universities were operating had
altered substantially in Australia in recent times – especially in terms of the commercializa-
tion of research. Perhaps, therefore, what was needed to deal with these changes were
legislative provisions or revised contractual drafting in the university sector.99
Interestingly, there is one piece of scholarly writing that is pertinent to a discussion of
the case, which was written well before the dispute between Dr Gray and the University
arose. According to Monotti,100 there is a very strong argument that Australian universities
are overreaching in their claim for intellectual property rights of their academic staff. First,
universities operate under enabling acts. Although such acts enable delegated legislation to
be promulgated, under section 109 of the Australian Constitution, those ‘laws’ will be
overruled by numerous federal statutes, which aim to safeguard the rights of originators
of intellectual property. Second, and of direct relevance to Gray’s case, Monotti noted
that universities attempt to rely on the legal (contractual) doctrine of the implied terms of
the contract of employment as a means of contending that the intellectual property of
employees vests in their employer. Monotti notes the very difficulty that arose in Gray,
whereby ‘the emphasis [can be diverted] from the difficult factual questions that can arise
in determining whether an intellectual creation is produced in the course of employ-
ment’.101 Another problem identified by Monotti lies at the centre of gravity and
complexity of intellectual property law in the academy. Patents, copyright, and moral
rights are all governed differently; so any university policy or agreement would have to
identify not only staff functions within an institution but also the type of intellectual
property concerned. In Gray, to this were added the overarching questions of trade
restraint, academic freedom, and the more philosophical question of what is the basic
purpose of a university. In other words, do intellectual property law and its associated
97 [2009] Federal Court of Australia: Full Court [Neutral Citation] 116 (3 Sep. 2009), at paras 190, 165 et seq. It is
interesting to note that the court relied on the work of Dr Robert Dean, The Law of Trade Secrets and Personal Secrets
throughout its judgment. Refer, e.g., [2009] Federal Court of Australia: Full Court [Neutral Citation] 116 (3 Sep. 2009),
para. 195.
98 [2009] Federal Court of Australia: Full Court [Neutral Citation] 116 (3 Sep. 2009), para. 106 et seq.
99 Ibid., paras 210–211. UWA applied for leave to appeal to the High Court of Australia. This application was
rejected on 12 Feb. 2010, see High Court of Australia Bulletin [2010] HCAB 1 (19 Feb. 2010).
100 A. Monotti, ‘Who Owns My Research and Teaching Materials – My University or Me?’, Sydney Law Review
19 (1997): 425.
101 Ibid., 445. In fact, the subsequent work of Monotti and Ricketson, Universities and Intellectual Property, was cited
by the court in Gray’s case; see, e.g., [2009] Federal Court of Australia: Full Court [Neutral Citation] 116 (3 Sep. 2009),
para. 169.
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legal doctrines function to unreasonably curtail an employee’s capacity to work as an
academic, duly breaching public policy considerations concerning the nature of the limits
on employees that are reasonable?
UWA v. Gray stands as something of a contrast to Victoria University of Technology v.
Wilson.102 In the latter case, an academic’s claim against his employer University was
unsuccessful. While the case did involve issues of contract, the decision particularly rested
on equitable considerations. In Wilson, a number of academics were brought to account by
the University in relation to an invention they made while they were employed by the
University. Essentially, the academics had advanced their invention through a private
company so that they gained profits to the exclusion of the University. Nettle J of the
Victorian Supreme Court rejected a number of the University’s arguments. His Honour
found that the intellectual property policy of the institution was not part of the employ-
ment contract since it had not been properly disseminated. Further, the two academics
were not per se employed to invent but to research, so they had not failed to comply with
their basic job description. However, it was held that one of the academics owed the
University a specific fiduciary duty not to allow his personal interests to conflict with those
of the University. The court found that this duty had been breached.
Essentially, the matter turned on the means and circumstances through which the
academics had come upon the commercial opportunity. The opportunity had emerged
from a former student whose intention was to exploit the University’s capacity to enhance his
idea. Likewise, most of the presentations made by the academics to persons who could
invest and assist in progressing the project all made reference to the academics in senior
positions within the University and most correspondence was on University letter head
noting the academics’ senior positions.103 As one judge was ultimately to suggest in a later
related judgment, the ‘cachet of the University’s reputation’ was a significant factor in the
venture.104
As the Full Court of the Federal Court of Australia stated in Gray, the Wilson decision
is easily distinguishable from Gray because Wilson was a ‘clear case of misappropriation of a
corporate opportunity in breach of fiduciary duty’.105 Unlike Gray, who was commercia-
lizing ideas he had worked on throughout his career and brought with him to UWA,
Wilson used his university as a springboard for his attempt at commercialization.
Some commentators, such as Riley, argue that Wilson ‘demonstrates that the equitable
jurisdiction presents a deeply conservative force in our legal system – a force oriented
towards perpetuating an ancient bias in favour of the employer side of the employment
contract’.106 Riley continues that ‘employment contract law must recognise that the
employee has a legitimate claim to take away into a new job . . . the fruits of their own
102 Victoria University of Technology v. Wilson [2004] Victorian Supreme Court 33 – per Nettle J.
103 Ibid.
104 Victoria University v. Wilson [2006] VSC 186 per Harper J.
105 [2009] Federal Court of Australia: Full Court [Neutral Citation] 116 (3 Sep. 2009), paras 210–211.
106 Riley, ‘Who Owns Human Capital?’, 22.
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talent, skill and knowledge developed during an earlier engagement’.107 While such
criticisms are no doubt a continuation of her basic ideology discussed earlier (that in an
era in which employees are easily made redundant, the law should support their capacity to
continually acquire new skills), in the respectful view of the present writers, such an
approach does not acknowledge the fact that Wilson had permanent tenure in his employ-
ment at the University. Further, it mitigates the correlative nature of equity – that he who
comes to equity must do so with clean hands.
4.2.1. Scots Law and English Law
The arguments raised above in the context of Australian law are also encountered, albeit in
a different form, in connection with the ownership of patents and copyright in respect of
written, literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic works in UK law. The ownership of patents
and copyright is governed by statute, namely section 39 of the Patents Act 1977 and section
11 of the Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act 1988. The pre-existing common law that
regulated the ownership of inventions and patents was swept aside by the introduction of
these pieces of legislation. In Harris’ Patent, Falconer J held that the common law was
superseded by section 39 of the Patents Act 1977 (‘the Act’).108 Like the current Australian
law, the common law obligations of employers and employees in England and Scotland
were based on the implied terms of the contract of service. The general rule that applied
was that an employer held rights of ownership in the inventions made by its employees
during the course of the employee’s employment by virtue of an implied term of the
contract of employment, which arose as a normal incident of the employment relationship.
That implied term could only be displaced by virtue of an express term of the contract of
service or an agreement that could be implied from the facts of the case. As the facts of
Sterling Engineering Co. Ltd v. Patchett109 demonstrate, it was particularly difficult for an
employee to establish the existence of such an express term or agreement to the contrary.
A general understanding was insufficient. The nature of the historical common law test was
therefore more or less identical to the current Australian position with the emphasis being
placed on whether the invention was created during the course of the employee’s
employment.
In terms of English law and Scots law, clear statutory criteria now exist that must be
satisfied before an employee will be deemed to be the owner of a patent or copyright.
While the common law is superseded, it has been recognized by the judiciary that the
statutory test does not differ a great deal from the previous common law.110 The general
balance is tilted in favour of the employer. However, that is not equivalent to a statement
that an employer will own a patent made by an employee in every case. Section 39(1)(a) of
107 Ibid., 2.
108 Harris’ Patent [1985] R.P.C. 19, 28 per Falconer J.
109 [1955] A.C. 534.
110 LIFFE Administration & Management v. Pinkava [2007] 4 All ER 981, 1011, para. [92] per Sir Andrew Morritt.
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the Act directs that an employer will own a patent invented by an employee if it was made
(a) in the course of the employee’s duties or (b) outside his normal duties but in respect of
duties specifically assigned to him by the employer and where the circumstances in each of
the cases (a) and (b) are such that an invention might reasonably be expected to result.
In terms of section 39(1)(b) of the Act, an employer will be also entitled to the patent
where it was made in the course of the duties of an employee who has a special obligation
to further the interests of the employer’s business.
Insofar as the construction of section 39 of the Act is concerned, there are a number of
pertinent issues to be addressed. First, in what circumstances will the employee be engaged
in the course of his normal duties where the circumstances dictate that an invention might
reasonably be expected to result? Second, in what circumstances will an employee not be
engaged in the course of his normal duties but have certain duties specifically assigned to
him where the circumstances dictate that an invention might reasonably be expected to
result? The distinction between normal duties and specifically assigned duties in section
39(1) of the Act closely resembles the discussion concerning the role of university
researchers in University of Western Australia v. Gray111 and Victoria University of Technology v.
Wilson112 and whether they are employed to research or invent. One will recall that
Australian law prioritizes the importance of the functional role of the employee. Thus,
employees who are employed to research are not necessarily deemed to be employed to
invent. By applying a functional test, the Australian courts enquire whether it was part of the
employee’s actual day-to-day duties to invent at the point in time that the invention was
created. If not, the invention will become the property of the employee and will not
automatically be deemed to vest in the employer.
For the purposes of ascertaining the difference between normal duties and specifically
assigned duties in the context of section 39(1)(a) of the Act, the recent case of the Court
of Appeal in LIFFE Administration & Management v. Pinkava113 is particularly instructive.
Pinkava was employed as a manager within the interest rates team of his employer, which
operated an electronic futures trading exchange. During the course of his employment, he
invented a system that enabled swap-based futures contracts to be exchange tradable.
The question was whether the invention had been made during the course of his normal
duties, specifically assigned duties, or duties falling outside his employment.
Although it was clear that Pinkava’s invention did not relate to his duties as manager as
described in his written service contract, it was held that the distinction between the
normal duties and specially assigned duties of the employee is predicated on a mixed
functional/contractual test. Thus, neither the written or oral terms of the contract of
employment114 nor the actual day-to-day or ordinary duties of the employee115 will be
determinative of the issue. Sir Andrew Morritt and Lord Justice Jacob examined this
111 University of Western Australia v. Gray (No. 20) [2008] Federal Court of Australia 498 – 17 Apr. 2008 per French J.
112 Victoria University of Technology v. Wilson [2004] Victorian Supreme Court 33 – per Nettle J.
113 [2007] EWCA Civ. 217; [2007] 4 All ER 981.
114 [2007] 4 All ER 981, 1002 and 1012, paras [56], [98] and [99] per Sir Andrew Morritt and Jacob LJ.
115 [2007] 4 All ER 981, 1002 and 1012, paras [57], [97] and [98] per Sir Andrew Morritt and Jacob LJ.
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requirement for a mixed functional/contractual test by exhorting that the nature of the
day-to-day work of the employee would be relevant but not the end of the enquiry. They
took the view that it was important to be pragmatic and recognize that one must look
beyond the duties of the employee as set out in writing in the contract. Here, the contrast
with Australian law is clear. Implicit within the mixed functional/contractual test is a
recognition in UK law that what constitutes the normal duties of the employee may
fluctuate over time and that they are not static. Thus, while one begins the analysis of
the employee’s duties by examining the description of those duties in a written contract of
employment, that is not in itself conclusive. It is important to assess how those duties have
changed over time. Thus, in the case of Pinkava, the court ruled that the duties of the
employee that were deemed to have been outside his duties before December 2003 had
then been specifically assigned to him in December 2003 and had subsequently transformed
into normal duties seven months later. Such is the effect of a mixed functional and
contractual test. Moreover, in Pinkava, the Court of Appeal held that whether the
circumstances of the employee are such that an invention might reasonably be expected
to result is assessed by reference to an objective test. The subjective views of the employee
and the employer are therefore irrelevant. Another useful case is Greater Glasgow Health
Board’s Application,116 which concerned a doctor who had created a new form of medical
equipment that represented a new and better way of diagnosing and treating patients. He
was employed by the Health Board as a Registrar and his written job description stated that
his duties were clinical responsibilities in the outpatient department and in casualty and
ophthalmic and general care of inpatients including ophthalmic surgery. Thus, his duties
were to treat patients. The question was whether the invention vested in the employer. It
was held that it did not, since the production of inventions did not form part of the
employee’s duties and he had conceived of the original idea for the invention not during
clinical work but while he was involved in a private study at home.
Third, when will an employee be engaged in such a way that he owes a special
obligation to further the interests of the employer’s undertaking in terms of section 39(1)(b)
of the Act? The Banks Committee,117 whose recommendations were largely implemented
by the Act, envisaged that section 39(1)(b) of the Act would be engaged where the
employees were directors or managers of companies in the sense that they would owe a
special obligation to further the interests of the employer’s business. This analysis is reflected
in the two most relevant cases, which are Harris’ Patent118 and Staeng Ltd’s Patents.119 Harris’
Patent concerned a manager of a company that sold valves. The manager’s primary duty was
to sell the valves and to use his specialist knowledge of such valves to deal with problems
experienced by the company’s customers by forwarding on problems to a Swiss company
for solution. He was not involved in developing valve products. His powers did not involve
116 [1996] RPC 207.
117 ‘Report of the Committee to Examine the Patent System and Patent Law’ (Banks Committee), Cmnd. 4407
(1970), 132 et seq., para. 443.
118 [1985] RPC 19.
119 [1996] RPC 183.
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the hiring or discharge of staff or even the approval of holiday dates. He did not attend
board meetings of his employer even as a manager when his department might have been
under discussion. The court ruled that the extent and nature of an employee’s obligation to
further the interests of the employer’s undertaking depended on the employee’s status and
the attendant duties and responsibilities of that status. Since the manager had only an
obligation to effect sales of the valves and to ensure after-sales service to customers of
valves supplied, his invention did not fall within paragraph (b) of section 39(1). Harris’
Patent can be contrasted with Staeng Ltd’s Patents where the relevant employee was
involved in the marketing of the employer’s products. Part of the employee’s role was to
generate novel ideas for new products. The employee was held to be sufficiently senior to
fall within section 39(1)(b) of the Act and thus the invention produced by the employee
was deemed to vest in the employer. Perhaps one means of distinguishing the differing
results in Harris’ Patent and Staeng Ltd’s Patents is that the manager in Harris’ Patent would
pass on problems to a third party for resolution, while in Staeng Ltd’s Patents, there was an
expectation that the employee would solve problems ‘by identifying the need for new
products or the modification of existing ones’.120
5. CONCLUSION
The early stages of this article began by considering two basic themes that unify its analysis.
One posed a simple question that pondered the reason why the area of the law relating to
restraint of trade was so confusing – in the sense that a proper understanding of the
applicable law entails the consideration of allied fields and conflicting policies. The other
theme is this article’s underlying metaphor – that new light can shine through old windows
and refract rays of light over many issues and new developments. Throughout this article,
attention has been drawn to the fact that new issues continue to evolve in the centuries old
doctrine of restraint of trade. Questions have arisen as to whether former employees can
lure away (from their former employer) former colleagues (the anti-poaching clause issue)
and consideration has been given to the use of cascading restraints, which provide the
employer with so many options of restraint.
As new industries emerge, which are information-driven, attention focuses on what is
a reasonable restraint in terms of time and place. Further, the relevance of potential mala
fides by employees becomes important especially in the field of IT, where knowledge can
be utilized by employees in businesses that operate throughout the globe. Finally, the
emergence of a strong body of intellectual property laws shows the relationship between
questions as to restraint of trade, the implied contractual doctrine as to who owns
intellectual property, and the relevance of good faith.
While Scots and English laws and Australian law display certain similarities in terms of
the manner in which they deal with anti-poaching clauses, there remain dissimilarities
120 P. A. Chandler, ‘Employees’ Inventions: Inventorship and Ownership’, European Intellectual Property Review 262
(1997): 266.
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especially in terms of cascading restraints. A potential rationale for the apparent bias in
Australia in favour of employers in the treatment of cascading restraint clauses relates to
Australia’s traditional labour law background. It is highly regulated by legislation and
collective agreements, as previously acknowledged in this work. As Heydon notes,121 the
courts are more likely to be vigilant as to breaches of the restraint of trade doctrine in
circumstances where an employee has unequal bargaining power and has been denied the
opportunity to bargain over the terms of the restraint clause. However, in cases where the
terms of employment ‘are prescribed with meticulous exactitude’, there is a strong union
presence in the workplace or where the employee is an executive, the perception of the
tribunal or court might be that the worker is less deserving of ‘protection’.122 This can be
contrasted with UK law where the extent of the bargaining power of the employee plays
no role in the issue of the reasonableness of a restraint of trade clause, since the focus of the
enquiry is on the nature of the commercial interest of the employer that the clause seeks to
protect and whether it is no more than reasonably necessary to achieve such protection.
Thus, the very nature of the reasonableness test is such that there is more emphasis or focus
on the employer’s interests, position, and the potential harm to the employer in the absence
of the covenant rather than the converse.
Traditionally, Australia has had many instances of working conditions that had been
prescribed meticulously well. Even with the new Fair Work Act 2009, which is based on
‘third way’ principles of flexibility and fairness, there are many safety nets for employees in
Australia. Perhaps the protective dimension of legislation spawns conservatism in some
judicial considerations of restraint issues. However, the fact that labour laws mediated
through the source of legislation are in the process of reform should, as Godfrey suggests,123
result in the Australian courts becoming more readily prepared to expand the common law
as a means of safeguarding employee rights by analogy with statutory rights – in much the
same way as has occurred in Scots and English laws.124 So, there is much to be gained from
an Australian perspective in examining Scots and English laws.
Likewise, there is much to be gained from an analysis of Australian law by a Scots or
English lawyer. On the subject of anti-poaching clauses and in the IT area, novel questions
arise, which require a novel and comparative approach to the basic issues of reasonable
restraint that have been with us for years. Particularly insofar as the notion of legitimate
interest and what is reasonable in terms of restraints for globalized and information-driven
industries reveals, much can be gained from comparative research.
121 Albeit speaking in more general terms about the approach of the courts to restraint.
122 Heydon, supra n. 7, 68.
123 K. Godfrey, ‘Contract of Employment: Renaissance of the Implied Term of Trust and Confidence’, Australian
Law Journal 77 (2003): 764, 776.
124 Johnson v. Unisys Ltd [2001] UKHL 13; [2001] 2 All ER 801, para. 35 per Lord Hoffmann.
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